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Introduction
Public bars in New Zealand traded from nine o’clock a.m. to six o’clock p.m. from Monday
to Saturday between 1917 and 1967, despite the fact that demand was concentrated on
five out of six trading days in the hour before closing1. The statutory closing of bars at six
o’clock p.m. in 1917 was initially a wartime regulation to restrict consumption of a
narcotic; this paper suggests that it was extended because it was favoured by key interest
groups, namely trade unions, hotel owners and prohibition organisations2.
Real wages of hotel employees increased under restricted bar trading hours because they
worked fewer hours for the same remuneration. When combined with hotel licensing,
investment quality fell because of higher search costs represented by limited time under
restricted trading hours. Revenues did not fall because aggregate demand for alcoholic
beverages was unaffected by shorter trading hours, but costs were lower because of
reduced investment in variety, in particular the quality of the drinking experience. Low
quality was used to justify political agitation for the more restrictive regulation promoted
by prohibition organisations.
                                                          
1 A public bar license permits the serving of alcoholic beverages to the public. Bars attached to hotel
restaurants were permitted to serve alcohol to hotel diners to eight o’clock p.m. at 1917, eleven-thirty p.m. by
1962. There was no limit to trading hours of private bars permitted to serve alcoholic beverages to hotel
guests. From 1967, hotel public bars traded for a maximum of eleven hours per day between the hours of
seven o’clock a.m. and eleven o’clock p.m.. Most trading hour restrictions were removed after market
liberalisation in 1989. Source: AJHR (1975) H-3 p 23.
2 There is an extensive literature on regulatory capture, which is concerned with the redistribution of wealth
by interests groups using the coercive powers of government. For seminal papers on this, see Stigler (1971)
and Peltzman (1976).
2The paper is organised as follows. The expected outcomes of six o’clock public bar closure
used by the legislature to justify its introduction are discussed in Section II. The gains to
interest groups from restricted bar trading hours are detailed in Section III. The reasons why
trading hours were extended in 1967 is discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes.
Section II.  The Background to Six O’Clock Closing
All alcoholic beverage retailers and retail outlets in New Zealand are licensed; the hotel
license was the important class of retail license during the period of six o’clock bar closure.
Restrictions on new hotel licenses, and on the transfer of hotel licenses to alternate sites,
existed from 18813. These restrictions concentrated hotels within central business districts4.
Prescribed trading hours were one of several conditions of hotel licenses in which non-
compliance was subject to license forfeiture without compensation5. The public bar trading
hours prescribed by the Licensing Act were the minimum hotel trading hours6. This is
because publicans were required to provide a minimum standard of accommodation, and
alcoholic beverages to guests, on demand twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The
requirement to provide accommodation regardless of the demand for it implied that bar
profits typically cross-subsidised hotel accommodation7.
                                                          
3 From 1881 to 1949 new retail licenses were only issued in licensing districts where the population had
increased by twenty-five per cent; hotel license transfers between licensing districts were prohibited. Within
licensing districts, transfers were limited to a maximum of half a mile (urban licensing districts) or one mile
(rural licensing districts) from 1904. Until 1919, any hotel license increase was subject to authorisation by
referendum; residential objections remained as a constraint to the siting of hotels. License issue and
redistribution from 1949 was controlled by a regulatory agent, the Licensing Control Commission. Restrictions
on license issue lowered hotel license density, from .0026 licenses per capita in 1890 to .0006 licenses per
capita in 1950. Restrictions on transfer and issue promoted variations in license density, of between 0.004
licenses and 0.00003 licenses per licensing district population in 1945. Source: Bloomfield (1984) p 120; AJHR
(1946) H-38 p 26-27, p 197.
4 Source: AJHR (1975) H-3 p 33.
5 See AJHR (1946) H-38 p 30 and passim; AJHR (1975) H-3 p 24. Hotel licenses could also be confiscated
without compensation by referendum from 1893 to 1975.
6 Prescribed public bar hours provided a minimum utilisation of hotel licenses. This maintained transfer
payments made to the issuing authority (licenses were issued, and excises on alcoholic beverages were
collected, by the Customs Ministry).
3Six o’clock public bar closure preceded by three years a similar statutory closing of all New
Zealand urban shops8. The rationales used to justify six o’clock shop and hotel closure
differed. Statutory retail trading hours were used with the system of arbitration that
regulated labour market to shorten the working week; statutes prevented retailers that did
not employ regulated labour from trading when regulated labour was not permitted, or was
subject to overtime premia. Six o’clock hotel closure was primarily based on a moral
argument, namely the ensuing reduction of alcohol consumption and decrease in
drunkenness (alcohol in New Zealand is largely consumed in the evening). Exigencies of war
were used to justify these and other moral arguments9.
Data do not support these arguments for six o’clock bar closure. Restrictions on public bar
trading hours had little impact on aggregate and per capita alcohol consumption (Figure
1)10. Nor did it affect the level of drunkenness; drunkenness convictions per capita fell in
1918 by a similar level to that which occurred in the preceding three years, and increased
in the following two years11. Drunkenness was in fact encouraged by the concentration of
demand between five o’clock p.m. and six o’clock p.m. on five of the six trading days.
Consumers with one hour to drink on licensed premises after work drank very quickly, and
often did so on an empty stomach. This increased the absorption of alcohol and hence its
narcotic effect12.
                                                                                                                                                                            
7 Source: AJHR (1946) H-38 p, ibid (1975) H-3 p 33-35.
8 From 1920, shops in urban areas above a population of six thousand closed at six o’clock p.m. on four of six
trading days, and at nine o’clock p.m. and one o’clock p.m. on each of the other two trading days. The
statutory closure of rural shops was not legislated in part because most rural workers at 1920 were not
covered by the system of arbitration that set trading hours: see Mulcare (1999).
9 Temperance groups argued that lower alcohol consumption would increase productivity and savings, and
lower the incidence of venereal disease amongst servicemen. Similar arguments were used to introduce six
o’clock bar closing in the United Kingdom and Australia during World War One. That fiscal authorities
accepted that six o’clock closing would lower alcohol consumption is implied by increases to beer excises of
21 per cent and 27 per cent respectively one month and two months before it was introduced. Source: NZPD
177 p 532; NZOYB (1932) p 278.
10 The market share of beer by alcoholic beverage volume in 1915 was 94%, 92% by 1967. In 1921 beer
excises doubled and the rate at which higher excises were levied on beer of a higher alcoholic content fell.
This should have caused consumers to switch to beer of a lower alcoholic content, and to consume more beer
to obtain equivalent concentrations of alcohol. This was the case after similar tax changes in 1942. Source:
AJHR (1946) H-38 p 62-65, p 164-165; Bloomfield (1984) p 120.
11 Source: ibid.
12 See Agarwal and Goedde (1989).
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                       Period of six o'clock closing
5Hotel profits were higher under restricted trading hours. This was acknowledged by
publicans, and implied by a fall in hotel profits in 1968 when the closing hour was
extended to ten o’clock p.m.13. Hotel profits fell in 1968 because increases in revenues did
not compensate for the higher labour costs incurred under longer trading hours. Labour
costs increased because of longer work hours and because of increased provision of variety
and quality (Section III).
The introduction of six o’clock closing as a wartime measure gave industry groups the
opportunity to experiment with a temporary reform. Its extension by the 1918 Licensing
Act Amendment passed without debate. This would not have been the case if interest
groups were dissatisfied with it14. The gains to interest groups from six o’clock bar closure
are detailed in Section III.
Section III.  Gains to Interest Groups
The fact that the restriction on bar trading hours did not produce the outcomes used to
justify it raises the question of why it was maintained for fifty years. That restricted bar
trading hours raised hotel profits suggests that it was in the interests of hotel owners. Two
reasons for higher hotel profits under restricted trading hours, namely lower expenditures
on quality and lower monitoring costs, are discussed in iii c) below. That six o’clock bar
closing was part of a wider objective to lower the working week suggests that it was in the
interests of organised labour. This is discussed in iii b). The benefits of six o’clock closing for
temperance and prohibition organisations, the interest groups usually associated with six
o’clock bar closing, are discussed in iii) a.
                                                          
13 Hotel profits in the year to October 1968 for the hotel chain of Hancock and Company were down by 52 per
cent on profits of the previous year, despite an increase in bar sales of 2 per cent. Bar sales in Auckland hotels
owned by the largest New Zealand brewery also rose by 9 per cent in 1968. Data on hotel profits at 1917 do
not exist. Source: Proceedings (1945) p 3005, p 3083, p 3571, p 3740, p 3754-3757, p 3869, p 3880, p 3895,
p 4016, p 4024-4025; NZB Archives.
14 Shorter hotel hours were also retained after World War One in all Australian states where it had been
introduced as a wartime measure.
6a) Prohibition and Temperance Organisations
Alcoholic beverage regulation was the primary interest of temperance and prohibition
organisations15. Membership to these voluntary organisations was largely determined by
their ability to influence legislative change. Their electoral support was sought by many
legislators in New Zealand from the 1880’s to the 1960’s, during which time close links
were maintained with organised labour16.
Prohibition and temperance objectives were represented in New Zealand by the New
Zealand Alliance, a lobby group that specialised in agitating for amendments to licensing
laws. It promoted these objectives through the continual introduction of legislation, often
with minor ‘compromises’, by parliamentary representatives. Bills were initially preceded by
petitions that signaled electoral support. Following the establishment of triennial licensing
referenda, an important focus for temperance and prohibition agitation, support for
alcoholic beverage regulation was indicated by votes for referenda options17.
The Alliance compromised to introduce six o’clock bar closure. Restricted bar trading hours
were to be included in the War Regulations Amendment Act 191618. It instead included two
compromise measures19, both of which facilitated the introduction of six o’clock bar closure
in the following year. The first compromise was a prohibition on hotel ‘treating’ or
‘shouting’, the purchase of multiple units of alcoholic beverages for consumption by more
                                                          
15 Temperance and prohibition organisations agitated for restrictive regulation of alcoholic beverage markets
as a way to increase standards of moral behaviour. The former sought to moderate alcohol consumption,
whereas the latter sought its abolition.
16 See Grigg (1981); NZ Licensee passim.
17 Source: AJHR (1946) H-38; NZ Licensee 33 9 p 53 and passim; NZOYB (1917) p 736-741; NZPD 180 p 222,
p 293. The alcoholic beverages market was the only market subject to triennial referenda, which were taken
at the same time as parliamentary elections. The licensing referendum gave electorates the choice of the
status quo (national continuance), a prohibition on the sale of alcoholic beverages over the whole country
(national prohibition), or nationalisation of alcoholic beverage retailing and manufacturing (state control). See
also note 57 below.
18 Statutes to close New Zealand hotels at nine o’clock p.m. and eight o’clock p.m. were rejected in the House
of Representatives by one vote and thirteen votes respectively in 1916. Eight o’clock p.m. was the
recommended closing time in the first reading of the bill that introduced six o’clock public bar closing.
Source: NZPD 177 p 549, ibid 180 p 217, p 291.
7than one consumer. It increased the number of transactions, which exacerbated hotel
labour shortages during wartime. Shorter trading hours offset this by reducing the demand
for labour; by concentrating demand, it also encouraged the purchase by consumers of
multiple units for own consumption as closing time drew near20.
The second compromise was a restriction on females on licensed premises, ostensibly done
to lower the supply of prostitutes on licensed premises and hence the incidence of venereal
disease amongst servicemen21. It effectively introduced six o’clock public bar closing for half
of the population, which generated agitation to extend six o’clock closing to the male
population22. By implicitly accepting a link between female patronage of hotels and
prostitution, the 1916 statute also strengthened a negative social attitude to female
consumption at bars. It helped promote female membership in temperance and prohibition
organisations that continued to maintain demand for six o’clock public bar closing23.
The maintenance of six o’clock bar closing was an important manifestation of the political
power of the New Zealand Alliance24. It was, along with the licensing referendum, one of
few reforms that appeared not to compromise the different objectives of prohibition and
temperance. Temperance organisations viewed the reform as moderating consumption by
restricting demand25. Prohibitionists viewed it in part as maintaining pressure for more
restrictive regulation of alcoholic beverage markets. The alliance of temperance and
                                                                                                                                                                            
19 Source: ibid 177 p 548-551, p 558-559.
20 Multiple purchases for own consumption were usually made when consumption speed increased. Faster
consumption ensured that beer did not go ‘flat’, that is, lose pressure. Publicans expected the prohibition on
treating to have a more adverse impact than six o’clock closing. Source: NZPD 177 p 54-561, p 558-559 ibid
307 p 2307.
21 Statutes existed from 1874 that prohibited publicans from supplying prostitutes on licensed premises.
Offenders faced instant hotel license forfeiture without compensation. Source: NZ Statutes (1916) p 104;
NZOYB (1917) p 231; NZPD 177 p 532, p 556.
22 Petitions to parliament on six o’clock bar closing obtained a hundred thousand signatures prior to the 1916
Act, and one hundred and seventy thousand signatures (representing 28 per cent of registered voters)
following the 1916 Act. Petitions for a prohibition on treating obtained thirty thousand signatures in 1916.
Source: NZPD 177 p 549; ibid 180 p 221-229; NZOYB (1916) p 27.
23 See Grigg (1983) p 153, p 157-158
24 Source: NZ Licensee 31 6 p 14, ibid 33 7 p 53, ibid  34 2 p 11, ibid 34 5 p 25. The longest enduring
temperance reforms in New Zealand were (in increasing order of longevity) six o’clock closing (1917-67),
triennial licensing referenda (1893-1975) and restrictions on retail licenses (1881-1989).
25 See Proceedings (1945) p 1389-1394, p 1948, p 5184 and passim. For a different perspective, see ibid p
6604.
8prohibition broke down when the recognition that concentrating demand did not promote
moderate alcohol consumption became more widespread (Section IV).
b) Trade Unions
Reductions to public bar hours were part of a general reduction in trading hours that
occurred once labour markets were regulated by arbitration26. Hotel labour differed from
labour in other trades in one critical respect from 1898; it was unable to negotiate lower
working hours in arbitration because hotel trading hours were prescribed by the Licensing
Act. The negotiation of a shorter working week for a minimum wage was an important part
of wage bargaining for all other trades in arbitration. Agitation to bring hotel workers
under the same conditions as other trades increased in the first two decades of the
twentieth century, as the relative wage of hotel labour fell to the point where it implicitly
set minimum wages27.
The relative wage of hotel labour was first raised by restricting the employment of low-
wage female and youth labour more than that which existed in trades subject to
arbitration28. Female and youth labour were eliminated from hotels in 1910 after political
agitation by the New Zealand Alliance29. The Licensing Act Amendment Act 1910 increased
the minimum age for entry to hotel bars to twenty-one and prohibited employment
contracts for new barmaids. It also brought public bar closing forward by one hour to ten
o’clock p.m.. Soon after, hotel labour was brought under most of the provisions of the
Shops and Offices Act that set employment conditions in other retail trades.
                                                          
26 See Mulcare (1999).
27 By 1913, the minimum wage for barmen aged twenty-two years and over was 42.5 shillings  (exclusive of
lodging and food) for a sixty-two hour working week, compared to a minimum wage of 50 shillings for a
fifty-two hour working week for male grocery assistants of the same age in the same industrial district.
Source: AJHR (1913) H-11 p 75; NZPD 153 p 842, ibid 156 p 1189; NZ Statutes (1910) p 307.
28 Trade unions negotiated minimum wages and youth and female quotas in arbitration. The minimum wage
for barmaids was 41% lower than the minimum wage for barmen. Source: AJHR (1913) H-11 p 75.
29 Prohibition and temperance groups considered the home to be the basic unit of a moral society, and
females to be the primary custodian of moral standards. They agitated for regulations that restricted feminine
employment to the home, and agitated for age restrictions to hotels to reduce the exposure of relatively
susceptible young people to ‘corrupting influences’ such as alcohol.
9The statutory elimination of female and youth hotel labour prevented their substitution for
adult male labour diverted to the war economy in 1914. This put upward pressure on real
hotel wages, at a time when increases to alcohol excises as part of war financing limited
the extent to which higher wages could be passed to consumers as higher alcoholic
beverage prices. Further reductions to public bar hours were used to lower demand for
hotel labour30.
Six o’clock bar closure precipitated rising real wages for hotel labour that included a fall in
their standard working week, from sixty-two hours to forty-eight hours in 1922. From 1936
to 1967, the standard working week for hotel and shop labour was the same except during
lags in revisions to licensing and shop statutes31. Trade unions resisted any move to extend
trading hours, including that of hotels, as threatening real wage gains secured in
arbitration32. Industrial action followed the extension of bar trading hours in 196733.
c) Hotel Owners
i) Amenity quality
Hotel owners gained from restricted trading hours primarily by economising on
expenditures on amenity quality. Variations in amenity quality are an important source of
product differentiation in less regulated alcoholic beverage retail markets34. New Zealand
hotels were characterised by a low level of improvement during the period of restricted
trading hours; improvements during this time were largely in compliance with the
minimum amenity standards prescribed by the Licensing Act35.
                                                          
30 See: NZPD 180 p 244-245, p 255, p 667-670 and passim.
31 Source: NZ Statutes (1921) p 379, ibid (1936) p 126-128, ibid (1945) p 309-312, ibid (1946) p 218.
32 Source: NZPD 307 p 2190-2199; Proceedings (1945) p 7145, 7158.
33 The Hotel Workers Union supported later closing with no extension to the number of trading hours. In 1967
it accepted the lifting of restrictions on the employment of part-time and casual labour in exchange for
higher basic wages. Source: NZ Licensee 34 5 p 26, ibid 34 11 p 27; ibid 35 12 p 17.
34 See Gourvish and Wilson (1994).
35  Between 1920 and 1935, three and a half times as many hotels improved their accommodation facilities as
improved their bar facilities; between 1935 and 1945, it was twice as many. This is despite the fact that the
bar trade generally cross-subsidised accommodation, and demand concentration from six o’clock closing
created a demand for bar improvements. Unlike accommodation facilities, bar facilities were not subject to
10
Restricted bar trading hours lowered demand for hotel quality, for two reasons. First, it
increased the costs of searching for quality. Consumers given one hour to travel to, and
consume at, hotels during their working week placed a low value on search relative to
consumption. Second, six o’clock public bar closing largely precluded classes with a
relatively high demand for quality, namely females36. Females usually consumed in hotel
lounge and restaurant bars but not in public bars. These bars were smaller, more labour
intensive and less well patronised than public bars. Higher charges made for these bars may
not have compensated for the higher level of services. This was influenced by the fact that
a higher incidence of females at hotels after trading hours were extended moderated the
alcohol consumption of males37.
A low demand for quality maintained minimum standards at existing levels. Higher
minimum hotel standards increased risk, for two reasons. First, a risk of confiscation of
industry capital by referendum existed until 1975, although trivial from 192838. Second, risk
pertained to hotel capital as long as regulation concentrated licenses within central
business districts. Reforms that widened the distribution of licenses lowered the value of
                                                                                                                                                                            
minimum standards other than for safety and sanitation until after 1948. Source: AJHR (1946) H-36 p 120-
134, p 362 and passim; ibid H-5 (1975) p 24-25; ibid H-3 (1949-72) passim; Proceedings (1945) p 3865, p
3950, p 3892, p 4023-4024; Statistics of Local Government (1921-24) passim; Local Authority Statistics
(1960-70) passim.
36 Most females legally permitted in hotels were housewives whose working day finished much later than six
o’clock p.m.. Industry surveys suggest that alcoholic beverage consumption by females increased from 43% of
the female population in 1968 to 52% by 1972. Over the same period, male consumption increased from 68%
to 70% of the male population. Source: NZLIC (1973) p 15.
37  Source: NZ Licensee 27 9 p 17, ibid 35 8 p 45-47 ibid 35 12 p 17. Exogenous demand changes from the
1960’s that lowered per capita alcohol consumption promoted the extension of markets to sectors with
moderate consumption profiles. Social sanctions against females at hotel bars began to ease from the 1960’s,
although females continued to be discouraged from public bars despite it being an offence not to serve them
in any bar (unless to do so contravened the Act).
38  Support for national prohibition at the licensing referenda peaked at 55% of the electorate in 1911, when
referenda options required a 60% majority to be introduced. From 1919, a 50% majority was required.
Support for national prohibition fell from 49.7% of the electorate in 1919 to 47.3% in 1925 and 40.2% in
1928. The annual rate of improvement of New Zealand hotels was 50 % higher in the period 1935-45 than in
the period 1920-35. Source: Bloomfield (1984) p 374-375; AJHR (1946) H-38 p 362.
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improvements in high license density areas39. Payments for quality also fell during a period
of price controls on public bar beverages and accommodation from 193940.
The lifting of price controls in 1961 occurred contemporaneously with the introduction of a
new license class, the tavern license. It differed from the hotel license in one key respect;
holders of a tavern license paid an annual fee equivalent to 3 per cent of liquor turnover, in
lieu of the obligation to provide accommodation and meals. This lowered the cost of siting
hotels in suburbs where there was little demand for hotel accommodation. Hotel
improvement in central business districts that followed the lifting of price controls
facilitated the transfer of licenses, from unimproved city hotels to sites in low license
density suburbs41.  It was at this point that the Council for the Licensed Trade that
represented the interests of publicans and manufacturers began to agitate for extended bar
hours42 (six o’clock bar closure limited the expansion of hotels into suburbs, because it gave
suburban residents who worked in central business districts insufficient consumption time).
Hotel owners were not the only group interested in maintaining a low level of hotel quality.
Prior to the 1970’s, a key characteristic of high quality in bars was chairs and tables for
‘sit-down’ drinking. The ‘stand-up’ drinking that prevailed in low-quality bars was less
expensive, both in terms of equipment costs and use of floor space. Temperance
organisations opposed sit-down drinking on the grounds that it increased the time spent at
                                                          
39 With strictly limited search time, widening the distribution of licenses, unless to nearby competitors, is
likely to have had minimal effect.
40 Controls on public bar beverage prices decreased demand at higher quality bars, by increasing the relative
price of beverages in uncontrolled lounge bars. Price controls were introduced to make manufacturers and
retailers partially absorb excise increases. They were lifted on the condition that trade representatives agreed
to a two-year moratorium on public bar beverage prices until after the next parliamentary election. Source:
Mulcare (1998) p 100; NZ Licensee 29 1 p 10, ibid 29 7 p 17; ibid 29 10 p 32, ibid 30 4 p 26; ibid 33 5 p 39,
ibid 34 3 p 49, ibid 34 5 p 25, ibid 35 8 p 45-47, ibid 35 12 p 17.
41 Hotel improvement in the 1960’s was mainly undertaken at large city hotels. Improvements to
accommodation at these hotels made the minimum standard accommodation in smaller city hotels
redundant, if not already so. License transfer was half the cost of a new license, although suburban hotel
licenses were more expensive than licenses in central business districts because of higher costs of defraying
objections. Source: ibid 30 4 p 26, 34 3 p 39, ibid 35 8 p 46.
42 The Council for the Licensed Trade was dominated by the interests of the two major breweries that held a
duopoly in brewing in New Zealand by 1971. It opposed the creation of the tavern license. Source: AJHR
(1965) H-3 p 4-16;NZ Licensee 30 4 p 26, ibid 31 6 p 14, ibid 33 5 p 37-39, ibid 34 5 p 25-27 and passim.
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hotel bars. Enforcement agents opposed it because stand-up drinking made policing of
drunkenness easier (drunkards may have trouble standing)43.
ii) Monitoring costs
Monitoring costs fell under restricted trading hours, for three reasons. First, quality fell and
became a less important determinant of demand than location. Related to this, demand
concentration lowered variability across hotels; higher monitoring costs are incurred at
retail outlets characterised by variations in sales44. Third, the number of transient consumers
at hotels fell, and markets monitor quality where transience is low45.
Lower quality and monitoring costs facilitated the substitution for franchisees of salaried
managers in a minority of hotels46 (salaried employees are more costly to monitor and have
less incentive to provide quality than residual claimants). But most hotels continued to be
franchised during the period of restricted trading hours, for two reasons. First, the trading
times of some hotels were not significantly altered by six o’clock public bar closing. Hotel
guests were not restricted to six o’clock, but the regulations meant that publicans were
obliged to supply hotel guests on demand. This obligation increased the costs of monitoring
trading outside of prescribed hours47. After-hours trading was extensive throughout New
Zealand, particularly in rural areas where the majority of consumers finished their working
day after six o’clock p.m.48.
                                                          
43 Source: Proceedings (1945) p 1134, p 3081, p 4772, p 5880.
44 Uncertainty arises over whether the more frequent periods of low sales experienced in variable outlets are
the result of shirking. Source: Martin (1988) p 955-956.
45 Lower transience can be expected to raise the quality of assets for which the minimum standards set by
Licensing Act did not pertain at the low quality spectrum of the market.
46 The majority of New Zealand hotels at the turn of the twentieth century were owned by brewers and liquor
wholesalers, and leased to publicans who sold alcoholic beverages under franchise. Franchises arose after
restrictions were imposed on hotel license issue (note 3); franchisees paid franchise fees determined by the
value of rents derived from hotel licenses. Prescribed hours are a common condition of franchise contracts
that are imposed to prevent retailers free-riding; two other common franchise conditions, namely minimum
retail amenity standards and exclusive territories, were also imposed by the Licensing Act. Source: Martin
(1988); Mathewson and Winter (1985); Mulcare (1998).
47 Enforcement agencies found it difficult to sort hotel guests, who were entitled to be served at hotels after
public bars were closed, from other consumers.
48 It was common for rural hotels to retain permanent lodgers, partly because of the absence of alternative
accommodation for single men in rural districts. Source: AJHR (1946) H-38 p 100-101; Proceedings (1945)
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That after-hours trading was more extensive in franchised than in managed hotels is
suggested by several facts. First, managers had less incentive than franchisees to work
after-hours because they were not residual claimants. Being on fixed salaries, they were
not rewarded for accepting more risk (after-hours traders could lose their licenses for
repeat offences). Second, bar sales fell in franchised hotels and rose in managed hotels
after bar hours were extended in 196749. Third, rural hotels were more commonly operated
by franchisees than managers. Given the longer employment hours of rural workers
compared to urban workers, sales in rural hotels should have increased faster than sales in
urban hotels following the extension of hotel hours if after-hours trading was not
extensively practiced. This is not the case50.
Franchisors had less incentive to monitor franchised hotels against after-hours trading than
managed hotels, for two reasons. First, hotel licenses could be revoked without
compensation if it were proven that hotel owners were privy to offences committed by
their publicans. Prosecuted hotel owners could more easily claim ignorance of the actions
of residual claimants than employees, particularly when the former were in rural hotels
located some distance from company offices51. Second, after-hours trading maintained
franchise fees. Franchisors incurred no additional costs from after-hours trading (other than
the risk of hotel license confiscation), because franchise fees were determined by hotel
sales, not hotel profits. After-hours traders compensated for longer working hours, by
charging a premium on after-hours sales which franchisors could not observe52. This
premium was not merely a service charge, but a form of price discrimination. After-hours
                                                                                                                                                                            
1572, p 1596, p 2528, p 4176, p 5142, p 5386, p 5427, p 5528, p 5881; NZPD 1955 p 2291-2299; NZ Licensee
34 11 p 28.
49 Source: NZ Archives.
50 Sales in Hancock and Company’s hotels in cities and towns were respectively 19% and 7% higher in
October 1967 compared with October 1968, but sales for the same period in Hancock and Company’s rural
hotels were only 1% higher. Source: ibid.
51 Monitoring costs were the critical variable of after-hour trading. Monitoring rural hotels was relatively
costly for urban-based hotel owners, which is one reason why rural hotels were franchised. Monitoring was
less costly for enforcement agencies subject to more extensive branch networks than franchisors. However,
enforcement agents in rural districts had a lower propensity to enforce after-hours hotel trading than their
urban counterparts: see Proceedings (1945) p 1595 and passim.
52 Lower monitoring costs are usually used to explain why sales rather than profits are monitored.
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trading promoted price discrimination by sorting out consumers who were prepared to pay
higher prices; after-hours consumers faced the risk of punitive action by enforcement
agencies and paid the higher prices of private bars53.
The second reason for the persistence of franchise contracts is that they were less regulated
than employment contracts. More specifically, franchisees could substitute family members
for more expensive regulated labour. Labour became less expensive from 1961, when the
prohibition on the employment of barmaids was lifted54.
Section IV Referenda and the Extension of Public Bar Trading Hours
Public bar hours were extended in 1967, after a referendum on the issue of hotel hours
returned a three-to-one majority in favour of later public bar trading. This was the reverse
outcome to the only previous referendum on hotel hours in 1949. It returned a three-to-
one majority in favour of the retention of six o’clock closing. It is suggested below that
these contrary referenda outcomes were the result of the input of interest groups to
referenda design. Furthermore, the long period before a referendum was first held, and the
period between it and the second referendum in 1967, reflected the influence of a stable
equilibrium, for much of the period, between special interest groups.
Support for the retention of six o’clock bar closure in 1949 largely came from outside the
temperance/prohibition movement. This is implied by the preferences revealed at licensing
referenda. Preferences for prohibition are expected to be revealed by the number of votes
for national prohibition. Temperance sentiment is expected to be revealed by this number
                                                          
53 After-hours trading was often effected in private bars. Because these bars were designated for hotel guests,
the risk of detection of after-hours trading was lower than in public bars. Private bar prices were usually a
minimum of 50% higher than public bar prices. Price discrimination was facilitated by licensing; restrictions
on license issue gave publicans market power, and the different bar classes specified by the license provided a
means to sort consumers and prevent resale. Source: Proceedings (1945) p 2481, p 3206, p 5228, p 5238, p
5864, 5888.
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and by the number of votes for the state control option. The vote for national prohibition
and state control at the 1949 referendum was respectively 25 per cent and 13 per cent of
the total vote; in 1966 it was respectively 17 per cent and 15 per cent of the total vote55.
The results of other referenda suggest that six o’clock bar trading hours were not primarily
viewed by electorates as a moral issue56.
Table 1 details the correlation between various referenda options. It shows that six o’clock
bar closure was more highly correlated with preferences for national
prohibition at 1966-67 than at 1949. It also shows a positive coefficient for the correlation
between preferences for later closing and national continuance at 1949, but a negative
coefficient at 1967. The vote for national continuance was viewed as a vote for the status
quo57. The different signs on the later closing/national continuation correlation coefficients
reflect the influence of voters who desired reform of alcoholic beverage markets in 1967
including an extension to bar trading hours58.
                                                                                                                                                                            
54 Female hotel labour was imported in the absence of skilled New Zealand labour. Source: NZ Licensee 29 1 p
23. See also ibid 27 9 p 17, ibid 33 10 p 47.
55 Source: Bloomfield (1984) p 374-75.
56 Lowering the consumption of alcohol was the primary, but not the only, objective of temperance groups in
New Zealand; other ‘vices’, such as gambling, were also targeted. Consequently, it is expected that
preferences for temperance should be positively correlated with preferences for stricter controls over
gambling. This is not the case, as a referendum on gambling taken in 1949 with the  referendum on bar hours
returned a two-to-one majority in favour of increasing the provision of off-course betting in New Zealand.
Source: NZ Gazette 22 (March 31) p 861; Bloomfield (1984) p 376; Grigg (1981).
57 The large and increasing majority for national continuance was used as evidence of satisfaction with
alcoholic beverage market regulation. This is one reason for the absence of referenda on bar trading hours
prior to 1949. Source: NZ Licensee 30 11 p 17 and passim.
58 Preferences on hotel hours in the 1949 referendum were also unrelated to the electoral mix of rural and
urban populations at 1937. Rural populations are expected to have a higher preference for later closing than
urban electorates, for two reasons. First, it was more common for rural workers than urban workers to finish
work later than six o’clock p.m.. Second, proportionately more males than females lived in rural districts (the
ratio of females to males in cities and in rural districts in 1951 was 107:100 and 89:100 respectively).
Females are expected to have a higher propensity than males to vote for six o’clock closing because they were
over-represented in temperance and prohibition organisations, and because six o’clock closing increased the
input of males into the raising of families. (Data on rural/urban electoral populations are available to 1937,
because rural populations were given greater representation than urban populations prior to 1946). Source:
McRobey (1989) p 91-92, p 95; NZ Statistics (1951) 1 p 17.
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Table 1: Correlation coefficients of percentage votes for referenda options, 1949 and 1966
licensing referenda and 1949 and 1967 bar trading hours referenda
Six o’clock closing and national prohibition
Year Correlation Coefficient
1949 0.53
1967 0.69
Extended hours and national continuance
Year Correlation Coefficient
1949 0.45
1967 - 0.25
Source: Bloomfield (1984)
===========================================================
Temperance organisations were an important voting block, and temperance groups within
the Alliance that had previously opposed extended bar trading hours began to agitate for it
in 1966. They did this after similar agitation by their Australian counterparts, and as the
perception that restricted trading hours encouraged drunkenness grew59. Prohibition
factions within the New Zealand Alliance maintained their opposition to extended trading
hours. One reason for this is that a high incidence of drunkenness under restricted hours
maintained political pressure for the more restrictive regulations they promoted. The
different preferences on bar trading hours of temperance and prohibition groups isolated
the latter and effectively undermined the New Zealand Alliance as a political force60.
                                                          
59 Source: NZ Licensee 32 8 p 23, ibid 33 12 p 49-50,ibid 34 5 p 26.
60 By 1966 the Committee of the New Zealand Presbyterian Church that recommended extended bar hours
was ‘unanimous in believing that prohibition agitation was a mis-direction of effort’. The Presbyterian Church
was the largest of the ‘non-conformist’ churches in New Zealand that had formerly supported six o’clock
closing. Following the extension of bar trading hours, the New Zealand Alliance began to promote state
control at the licensing referendum more heavily than it had done so in the past. This may be viewed as an
attempted rapprochement between prohibition and temperance organisations. It may also be viewed as an
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The different outcomes of the trading hour referenda not only reflect the changing
preferences of temperance groups; they also reflect different referenda design. The 1949
referendum gave voters two options, closing at six o’clock p.m. or closing at ten o’clock
p.m.. It did not specify whether bar hours would remain the same if ten o’clock closing was
permitted, and this implied the possibility of broken trading hours61. Lack of information is
considered a major reason for electoral support for the retention of six o’clock closing at
194962. The 1967 referendum gave electorates the choice of either six o’clock closing, or
later closing with trading hour variations to be set by a regulatory agency; these options
were understood to respectively imply the existing minimum nine bar hours, or a maximum
of eleven bar hours and ten o’clock p.m. closing63.
Interest groups provided little input to the design of the 1949 referendum, which suggests
that they were satisfied with the design proposed by the legislature and with the status
quo. They were not satisfied with a preliminary draft of the 1967 referendum. It implied
similar trading hours to the 1949 referendum, either the status quo or later opening, ten
o’clock p.m. closing, and a break between six o’clock p.m. and eight o’clock p.m.. It was
rejected by all major interest groups with the exception of the New Zealand Alliance and
trade unions64.
The extensive input by interest groups to the design of the 1967 referendum primarily
concerned the number rather than the timing of bar hours65. The New Zealand Alliance and
the Hotel Workers Union preferred the existing number of trading hours. Temperance
                                                                                                                                                                            
attempt to maintain the referenda, by supporting the option favoured by the minority of the legislature who
wanted alcoholic beverages nationalised. Source: NZ Licensee 33 8 p 29, ibid 35 6 p 10-15.
61  The 1945 Royal Commission on Licensing had instigated the referendum on bar trading hours. It had
recommended later public bar closing but shorter trading hours broken into three shifts. The lowering of the
standard working week to forty weekly hours in 1945 also made increased public bar hours in 1949 less likely.
Source: AJHR (1946) H-38 p 69, p 308, p 394, p 411-412, p 420.
62 Source: NZ Licensee 16 2 p 1-2, ibid 33 5 p 38, ibid 34 3 p 10; ibid 34 4 p 10.
63 Source: ibid 34 9 p 11.
64 Temperance groups rejected it on the grounds that it would increase drunkenness by concentrating demand
in two periods instead of one. Source: NZPD 351 p 2004, ibid 352 p 859, p 2685; NZ Licensee 33 9 p 53; ibid
34 3 p 10; ibid 34 4 p 11; ibid 34 5 p 25-27; ibid 34 6 p 11; ibid 34 8 p 22.
65 Source: ibid.
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groups and hotel owners were either neutral as to the number of trading hours, or preferred
an increase in the number; their main concern was to extend the hour of closure. The final
referendum design was similar to that proposed by the Council for the Licensed Trade66.
VI Conclusion
Six o’clock bar closure was retained for fifty years because of the gains to interest groups.
It was a symbol of the political influence of prohibition and temperance groups. For trade
unions, it maintained real wage increases secured in arbitration. For hotel owners, it
maintained the value of capital concentrated in central business districts by regulation. It
did this by giving most urban consumers insufficient time to consume at other locations
before bars closed; hotel owners did not have to invest in product quality or variety.
Restrictions on trading hours were largely ignored where capital concentration did not exist
and franchises facilitated after-hours trading.
Six o’clock bar closure differed from that of other retail outlets largely in the process by which it
was obtained. It disadvantaged consumers more than shop closing, because bars provided on-
premise consumption whereas most shops did not. For this reason, it is unlikely that six o’clock
bar closure would have been acceptable to electorates without the use of moral suasion. Public
bar trading hours were extended once the lobby group that promoted moral arguments for six
o’clock bar closure was no longer able to organise effective resistance to consumer sovereignty.
This event was contemporaneous with regulation promoting changes to hotel location that
facilitated an extension to bar trading hours.
                                                          
66  Source: ibid 34 4 p 11-12.
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